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It has been proposed that recognition can form the basis of simple but ecologically rational decision strategies
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann, & Gigerenzer (1999) found that constructing share
portfolios based on simple name recognition alone often yielded better returns than the market index. We describe four
studies with seven samples of participants from three countries (total N = 319) in which the returns of recognized and
unrecognized shares from several stock markets were tracked over various periods of time. We find no support for the
claim that a simple strategy of name recognition can be used as a general strategy to select stocks that yield better-than-
average returns. However, there was some suggestion in the data that recognition performs better when the market is
falling and worse when it is rising. A follow-up study indicated that the absence of an overall recognition effect could
not easily be attributed to our reliance on student participants or smaller samples than Borges et al. (1999) had used.
We conclude that, with respect to changes in value, selecting stocks on the basis of name recognition is a near-random
method of portfolio construction that offers little, if any, benefit to the personal investor.
Keywords: heuristics, recognition, investment.
1 Introduction
Can quick-and-dirty decisions reasonably be expected to
result in satisfactory outcomes, or do complex problems
demand complex strategies? The extent to which the ar-
ray of difficult choices that we face can be adequately
tackled by simple strategies has been a recurring theme
in five decades of decision research (e.g., Simon, 1956;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Payne, Bettman & Johnson,
1993; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003). One of the simplest
choice or inference strategies imaginable is the recogni-
tion heuristic . Quite simply, “If one of two objects is
recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recog-
nized object has the higher value” (Goldstein & Gigeren-
zer, 1999, p.41). Thus, when asked to pick which movie
yielded the greater gross takings, Sin City or Steget Efter,
the person who recognizes only one of these titles can use
the recognition heuristic (though the person who recog-
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nises neither or both of these movies must make their
choice some other way). When the rate or frequency
of exposure correlates positively with value, the heuristic
will lead to choice or inference accuracy above chance
levels (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Thus, in our
example, the positive association between media cover-
age (such as advertising) and movie attendances means
that the recognition heuristic should have some ecolog-
ical validity for the choice in question. Recent analysis
by Schooler and Hertwig (2005) shows that the effec-
tiveness of recognition may even be enhanced by forget-
ting — even though this leads to a failure to recognize
some previously seen objects. If remembered objects are
more likely to be associated with the relevant characteris-
tics of the environment than forgotten ones, this will en-
hance the predictive or inferential power of recognition.
In this paper we examine the application of the recogni-
tion heuristic to investment decisions, where one of many
possible investments can be made. Here the recognition
heuristic demands that: “when choosing a set of objects
from a larger set, choose the subset of recognized ob-
jects” (Borges et al., 1999, p. 61).
Why might people use such a heuristic? First,
in some situations, they may consciously accept the
logic expressed in the previous paragraph. It probably
makes sense to many people that the consumer products,
movies, sports teams, and sports personalities that they
29
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 2007 Stock recognition 30
have heard of are more successful than those they have
not — and they will be happy to make inferences ac-
cordingly. There are occasions when failure generates
notoriety: Ford’s Edsell car, the movie flop Waterworld,
the 1988 Jamaican bobsleigh team, or “Eddie The Eagle”
(whose Olympic ski-jumping preparation lacked only a
ski-jump). Nonetheless, generally speaking, people know
that it is success that breeds the personal exposure or col-
umn inches that will encourage recognition.
Alternatively, there may be other occasions when, in
the absence of deliberative reasoning about recognition,
more intuitive processes may drive recognition-based
choices. People reliably prefer familiar stimuli (see Born-
stein, 1989, for a review of a variety of mere exposure
effects) — more so when they fail to recognise previ-
ously presented stimuli at better than chance levels and
are presumably not conscious of prior exposure (Born-
stein & D’Agostino, 1992). Bornstein (1989) suggests
that a preference for the familiar may be adaptive, as un-
familiar stimuli and situations have greater potential for
risk than familiar ones do. People also judge more fluent
(i.e., more easily processed) stimuli positively (e.g., Re-
ber, Winkielman & Schwarz, 2004); and often base their
judgements on how easily objects or events can be re-
called (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Although not nec-
essarily easy to distinguish empirically, such accounts are
conceptually distinct from the recognition heuristic —
stimuli may be more or less familiar, fluent or available,
but are simply recognised or not recognised. Nonethe-
less, recognised stimuli are inevitably more familiar and
more available than unrecognised ones, and possibly,
on average, more fluent too (see Alter & Oppenheimer,
2006). These features could explain why recognition-
based choice may occur, even when the conditions that
make it an effective strategy in certain circumstances are
unknown or absent.
The use of the recognition heuristic has been the sub-
ject of several empirical investigations. Gigerenzer and
Goldstein (1996) reported that this heuristic helped peo-
ple to make correct inferences when faced with the task
of assessing which of two foreign cities had the greater
population. With some modified experimental designs,
this observation has also been replicated for additional
samples of cities (Oppenheim, 2003; Bröder & Eichler,
2005), for rivers and for mountains (Pohl, 2006). As-
sessing such geographical objects is associated with sta-
ble characteristics: the true answer has rarely changed
in living memory, and will usually not change for many
years to come (see Serwe & Frings, 2006). For example,
the correct answer to the question “Which city is larger:
Colchester or Stockholm?” has been the same for cen-
turies and is unlikely to be different in the foreseeable fu-
ture. This contrasts with dynamic domains such as sports
events, where the accuracy of inferences varies over time.
For instance, tennis ace Roger Federer is likely, though
not certain, to beat the lowly-ranked Ezequiel Krivulin.
Furthermore, there may eventually come a time when this
highly recognized superstar will begin to lose on a regu-
lar basis to younger unknown players. Nonetheless, it has
been shown that recognition can, to some extent, predict
the outcome of sports events (Serwe & Fring, 2006).
In this paper we re-examine the effectiveness of the
recognition heuristic using an important, but notoriously
difficult, task — stock picking. This task is also as-
sociated with variable characteristics, and so provides a
tough test for the recognition heuristic. Borges et al.
(1999) found name recognition to be a surprisingly suc-
cessful basis for stock investment. Lay people and busi-
ness graduates in the USA and Germany indicated which
company names they recognized among the largest com-
panies listed on the New York and Frankfurt stock ex-
changes. Portfolios of shares consisting of the most fre-
quently recognized shares outperformed portfolios con-
sisting of shares recognized by fewer than 10% of partici-
pants over a six-month period beginning December 1996.
These portfolios of frequently recognised shares outper-
formed the market index in six of eight possible com-
parisons (treating recognition data from the four pools
of participants across each of the two stock markets as
distinct comparisons). Only for Americans’ recognition
of U.S. stocks did recognition-based investment under-
perform the market index. This was symptomatic of a
general trend in which the advantage for highly recog-
nised stocks was greatest when people were apparently
most ignorant — i.e., using the recognition data for for-
eign stock markets (where recognition rates were, unsur-
prisingly, lower than for domestic stocks).
That such a simple strategy should prove to be effec-
tive was surprising — and therefore grabbed attention
among the financial press as it runs counter to the ef-
ficient market hypothesis, which anticipates that the in-
dex cannot consistently be beaten by simple investment
strategies. Borges et al. (1999) provide some speculation
on the reasons for their results, for instance the possibil-
ity that features such as market share, company size and
prestige may all be associated with both recognition and
profitability, and that limited recognition best exploits the
ability of the recognition heuristic to discriminate prof-
itable and unprofitable shares. Put simply, the sugges-
tion is that company success and other features that foster
recognition also tend to drive up share value. Hence rec-
ognized shares will yield higher average returns than un-
recognized ones. If an individual recognizes few shares,
they probably only recognize the elite companies whose
size and success has made them household names with
good prospects for share return. However, an important
question is whether such a mechanism could be sustain-
able in a market?
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Boyd failed to replicate Borges et al.’s (1999) results
in a falling (“bear”) market with a sample of American
students providing recognition data on US stocks. Both
Boyd (2001) and Borges et al. (1999) discuss the possi-
bility that recognition may not be a good strategy in such
markets (when “big” firms are often observed to perform
poorly).1
Merton’s (1987) model of capital market equilibrium
predicts that attempts to replicate Borges et al.’s (1999)
finding are more likely to fail than to succeed. Mer-
ton (1987) points out that investors can acquire only
those shares that they recognize. Consequently, demand
and value will tend to be higher for company shares
that are widely recognized. However, Merton’s theory
predicts that investment returns will correlate negatively
with recognition — more highly recognized firms will
yield lower returns, implying that the recognition heuris-
tic should under-perform the market index. This is con-
sistent with the “neglected firms effect” whereby the
shares of firms with narrow investor bases outperform
more widely held shares (Arbel, Carvell & Strebel, 1983;
Arbel & Strebel, 1982). The effect persists even when
company size is controlled, and may be interpreted as
an informational effect. For obvious reasons, investors
need information in order to predict future profits, divi-
dends, and stock returns. The less information investors
have, the greater the chance that important information
that predicts extreme changes in value is missing. How-
ever, investment-relevant information (e.g., earnings re-
leases) will be less abundant, and therefore more expen-
sive, for obscure firms than for “high-profile” corpora-
tions that enjoy high levels of recognition and that re-
lease detailed reports on a regular basis. Therefore, in or-
der to invest in unfamiliar companies, investors require a
(risk) premium on their investment, which roughly corre-
sponds to their increased effort in searching for informa-
tion about those companies. Risk aversion would make
1When revising our manuscript, we learned about a study on recog-
nition published in a German business-psychology journal (Frings,
Holling, & Serwe, 2003). This study evaluated the effectiveness of the
recognition heuristic in constructing profitable portfolios of stocks. 125
German students stated whether they recognized each of the 50 compa-
nies that were quoted on Nemax50, which was a special list of the Ger-
man stock exchange consisting of smaller technology companies. Using
the students’ responses, three portfolios of stocks were built: (A) highly
recognized companies, (B) moderately recognized companies, and (C)
nearly unrecognized companies. The performance of the portfolios was
tracked over ten different months starting from June 2000 to June 2001,
a period characterized by falling stock-prices. Performance was mea-
sured as raw return and pitted against the Nemax50-index. Portfolios
A and C were worse than the index in eight of the ten periods, while
Portfolio B was beaten in six periods. Frings et al. (2003) concluded
that the recognition heuristic is not effective and that their finding could
be due to the particular time periods that were chosen. In contrast to our
study, these authors measured stock recognition at only one occasion,
had participants from a single country, used native stocks, and checked
raw returns over one month periods.
investing in the potentially risky shares of relatively un-
known firms comparatively unappealing, unless better-
than-average returns can be expected from such shares. In
contrast, the market will sustain share returns from well-
known companies that are more modest, as investors feel
that they have, or can obtain, sufficient information on
these shares to be able to guard against the risk of severe
losses.
Several studies have examined factors that ought to af-
fect recognition (see Lehavy & Sloan, 2005) such as ana-
lyst coverage, advertising expenditure or exchange list-
ing. Many of these have found an effect upon secu-
rity value consistent with Merton (1987). For instance,
Barber and Odean (2005) showed that private investors
tended to purchase “high-profile” stocks that had previ-
ously experienced high volumes or returns, or had been
in recent news reports. This strategy was shown to under-
perform the market index. Weber, Siebenmorgen and We-
ber (2005) provide some insight into why investors might
follow an (unprofitable) investment strategy driven by the
“attention-grabbing” features of shares. They found that
people tend to perceive shares that they recognize as less
risky than those that they fail to recognize.
More direct tests of Merton’s theory have tended to
focus on breadth of ownership (among institutions with
holdings in excess of $100 million) as a proxy for recog-
nition. Contrary to the predictions of Merton (1987),
Chen et al. (2002) found that low levels of recogni-
tion predicted low returns. However, Lehavy and Sloan
(2005) showed that changes in the breadth of ownership
do indeed positively predict current share value and neg-
atively predict future returns (when autocorrelations for
value or return over time are controlled). Lehavy and
Sloan (2005) and others who have examined breadth of
ownership recognize its limitations as a proxy for recog-
nition. Whilst it is plausible that increases in recognition
will often result in increases in the breadth of ownership,
it is illogical that decreases in the breadth of ownership
might imply that some investors no longer recognize a
particular company that they previously knew of.
The studies reported here employ a direct measure of
recognition: we simply ask a sample of people whether
they recognize the name of a companies listed on the
stock exchange. Thus share recognition is considered at
the level of the individual (potential investor), rather than
at the level of the large corporate investor. We use these
data to re-examine whether simple recognition alone can
form the basis of a viable investment strategy. In par-
ticular, two questions that relate to how well Borges et
al.’s (1999) findings generalize are considered. Firstly,
were their results simply a function of random variation
in prices or applicable only to a particular period of time?
To this end our studies commence at different time points,
and we track share value over differing periods of time.
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Readers will see that, despite being at the mercy of the
markets, this allowed us to test the effectiveness of the
recognition heuristic in markets that fell and rose to dif-
fering degrees — permitting a detailed re-evaluation of
Borges et al.’s (1999) and Boyd’s (2001) findings under a
variety of conditions. Secondly, are Borges et al.’s find-
ings restricted only to particular combinations of pop-
ulations of participants and stock markets? Thus, can
one say that “recognition is an ecologically valid strat-
egy for stock selection” or simply that “recognition data
from Germans and Americans selects better than average
German stocks.” In considering this issue, we examine
recognition data on stocks from five countries for partic-
ipants from three countries. In all, 13 of the 15 possible
combinations that this could yield are available — and
some combinations can be examined for more than one
study (with recognition data from different samples of
participants collected at different points in time). This
permits us to test the recognition heuristic over a range of
recognition rates (typically high for domestic or “home”
shares, and low for overseas or “away” shares). Exami-
nation of many such participant-market combinations is
important in order to determine whether there might be
any general effect that favours (or penalizes) recognized
over unrecognized shares. Although Borges et al. (1999)
report eight comparisons between portfolios of recog-
nized and unrecognized shares, these are not indepen-
dent comparisons. For instance, there was some overlap
in which shares are always recognized by laypeople and
business graduates from a given country (Borges et al.,
1999, p. 63).
In summary, we re-examine the two key findings of
the Borges et al. (1999) data: (1) the overall validity of
recognition as a method of stock selection, and (2) the in-
creased effectiveness of recognition for “more ignorant”
participants with lower levels of recognition. Note that
we are not interested in whether personal or professional
investors actually use the recognition heuristic — simply
in whether, if they did, it would be effective.
2 Method
All four studies have similar design and analyses, and are
therefore presented together.
In all studies, participants indicated which company
names they recognized from lists of companies listed on
major European stock exchanges. Within a given study,
all participants were given identical lists of companies,
presented in alphabetical order. These recognition data
were collected approximately one week before the com-
mencement of the period for which share prices were fol-
lowed. Participants are identified by their country of res-
idence, though each sample contained a minority of par-
ticipants for whom that would not be their country of ori-
gin. Data collection took only a few minutes, so there was
no need to induce participation by reimbursing partici-
pants for their time. However, after providing recognition
data participants were offered the opportunity to enter a
share prediction competition for which prizes were on of-
fer. These data are not reported here.
In Study 1, 53 UK psychology students provided
recognition data for Italian stocks (all 30 companies listed
on the Italian Mib30 index at that time). Share values
were followed from 14 October 2002 onwards.
In Study 2, 52 UK psychology students and 15
Swedish business students provided recognition data for
stocks from the UK, Swedish and Italian stock ex-
changes. Data were obtained for 45 shares, 15 from each
of the three stock exchanges (listed on the UK FTSE100,
Swedish Stockholmbörsen and Italian Mib30). Shares se-
lected were those with the 15 highest trading volumes
(within each exchange) on the afternoon of 6 October
2003. Share values were followed from 16 October 2003
onwards.
In Study 3, 70 UK psychology students, 78 Austrian
business students and 36 Swedish business students pro-
vided recognition data for Austrian, Swedish and Ger-
man stocks. Data were obtained for 48 shares, of which
nine, 16, and 23 concerned shares listed on three stock
exchanges (Austrian prime list, the Swedish A-list, and
the German prime standard). The shares were randomly
selected. Share values were followed from 30 April 2004
onwards.
In Study 4, 15 Swedish business students provided
recognition data for UK, Swedish and Italian stocks. Data
were obtained for 44 shares, the same shares examined in
Study 2, less one UK company that had ceased to trade.
Share values were followed from 1 November 2004 on-
wards.
2.1 Analysis
Share returns were tracked for a 2-month period,
and for longer periods in six-monthly increments
from six months upwards. Two-month returns
were taken from the appropriate exchange web-
sites, and returns for longer time periods were ob-
tained retrospectively from the Yahoo Finance website
(http://finance.yahoo.com/). Share returns
for time periods of six months and greater were unavail-
able for a small number of shares in Studies 1, 2 and 4
(e.g., due to cessation of company trading). These were
simply excluded from analysis.
Share return was valued as the percentage increase (or
decrease) in the price of an individual stock over a given
horizon. Raw share returns were used as our primary
means of calculating changes in value, though some anal-
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yses were re-examined using dividend-adjusted prices
that reflect the investor’s total earnings from the stock.
We analyzed the data in two ways:
1. Individual analyses. This first method addressed the
question of whether an investor could use his or her
own recognition of shares as the basis of a viable
personal investment strategy. We created a port-
folio for each individual participant of the shares
that he or she recognized (with equal investment
in each share). By comparing the performance of
these recognition portfolios to the complementary
portfolio of unrecognized shares, or to the average
performance of all shares in the consideration set,
we could determine whether recognition does in-
deed select shares that yield better-than-average re-
turns. This tested whether individual investors (who
do not necessarily know which companies are well
known to those around them) can generally exploit
their own recognition. Returns adjusted for divi-
dends (and splits) were also examined on these port-
folios — we report these where results differ from
unadjusted (raw) returns.
2. Correlations between recognition and return. This
second method examined whether an investor could
exploit knowledge about the levels of recognition
enjoyed by different companies. We computed
the correlation between company name recognition
(percentage of participants recognizing the com-
pany) and the raw return. This was done sepa-
rately for each combination of participant group and
stock market (19 possible combinations over the
four different studies). This dealt with the possibility
that pooling shares from different markets together
might obscure some patterns in the data.2
3 Results
3.1 Levels of recognition
For every participant group in each of the four studies,
there was at least one share that no participant recog-
nized and one share that all participants recognized (with
one exception: the Swedes in Study 3 had a maximum
recognition of 97.3%). Thus, although practical consid-
erations meant that we were able to examine only a rela-
2We also analyzed our data as Borges et al. (1999) did — by exam-
ining returns for separate portfolios of the most and least recognized
shares. This required establishing arbitrary cut-off points to define
“highly recognized” and “rarely recognized or unrecognized” shares.
The results yield a similar picture of the relationship between recogni-
tion and return to those reported in our results, and, in order to avoid
redundancy, are not reported. A summary of these analyses is available
on request from the authors.
tively small number of shares, levels of share recognition
spanned the full range possible.
The mean and standard deviation rate of recognition
are shown in the upper rows of Table 1.3 These means
show that a range of levels of recognition apply across
the study groups, and the standard deviations indicate that
recognition rates have reasonable variation within most
participant groups.
3.2 Individual analyses
Here we analyse our data with each participant represent-
ing a case. Specifically, for each participant we examined
the profitability of his or her recognition portfolio, and
then aggregated the findings across each study group. Ta-
bles 1 to 4 summarize the returns accrued by the recog-
nition portfolios, and allow comparison with the average
return of the stocks included in each study, as well as with
the complementary portfolios of unrecognised shares. In-
stances when the recognition heuristic outperforms the
market index are denoted by a positive effect, whereas
a negative effect indicates that investors are better off
adopting an “anti-recognition” heuristic of investing in
unrecognized shares. Results clearly vary from sample
to sample — sometimes portfolios of recognised shares
yield better-than-average returns, but at least as often the
reverse is true.
Overall results are shown for 2-, 6-, and 12-month re-
turns and indicate no consistent evidence favouring rec-
ognized over unrecognized shares, or vice versa. The
overall effect sizes (data pooled case-by-case from all
samples), which include over 300 observations, were not
significantly different from zero for 6- and 12-month re-
turns, with 95% CIs of (–0.05, 0.24) and (–0.23, 0.05)
respectively. In the 2-month case, mean returns were sig-
nificantly lower than the average return of the stocks ex-
amined, 95% CI of (–0.57, –0.17). Statistical power for
each analysis was in excess of 52% to detect a small ef-
fect (d = 0.2), and in excess of 88% to detect a small-to-
medium effect (d = 0.35) (Cohen, 1969). All three sign
tests for these combined data were non significant. Thus
the number of occasions on which recognition portfolios
outperformed average stock return (and therefore out-
perform the complementary portfolios of unrecognized
shares) was balanced by a similar number of occasions
3In Tables 1 to 4:
(1) Positive effect size indicates mean recognition portfolio return
> average stock return, negative effect size indicates mean recognition
portfolio return < average stock return. Pooled effect size (final column
of Tables 1-3) is based on standardised differences within each sample:
(Recognition portfolio return — Average stock return)/(SD of return for
recognition portfolios)
(2) Positive z indicates the majority of recognition portfolios yielded
better returns than the complementary portfolios of unrecognized
shares.
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Table 1: Recognition rates and two-month raw share returns.
Study 1 2 3 4 Overall
Sample UK UK Swedish UK Swedish Austrian Swedish (pooled)
Mean % of companies recognized 10.2 42.9 58.8 13.8 41.6 39.0 63.4
SD % of companies recognized 11.1 7.6 11.8 7.0 9.0 13.4 9.12
Average stock return (A) 21.0 2.0 2.0 −1.5 −1.5 −1.5 8.0
Mean % return, recognition portfolios (B) 13.1 0.2 0.1 −1.7 0.2 0.3 6.2
SD % return (recognition portfolios) 10.4 1.0 0.5 3.1 1.1 2.0 0.6
Effect size [B versus A] (1) −0.76 −1.87 −3.89 0.06 1.55 0.90 −2.87 −0.36
No. of portfolios > average return (C) 7 4 0 49 32 62 0 154
No. of portfolios < average return (D) 46 48 15 21 4 16 15 165
z for sign test [C versus D] (2) −5.36** −5.96** −3.61* 3.23* 4.50** 5.10** −3.61* −0.56
* p < .05, ** p < .0001
Table 2: Six-month raw share returns.
Study 1 2 3 4 Overall
Sample UK UK Swedish UK Swedish Austrian Swedish (pooled)
Average stock return (A) 11.8 4.5 4.5 −5.4 −5.4 −5.4 6.8
Mean % return, recognition portfolios (B) −18.7 4.5 4.8 −4.6 −3.6 −3.5 7.5
SD % return (recognition portfolios) 17.6 1.3 0.9 4.5 1.5 2.9 0.9
Effect size [B versus A] (1) −1.73 0.00 0.33 0.18 1.20 0.66 0.78 0.10
No. of portfolios > average return (C) 6 16 9 45 30 59 11 176
No. of portfolios < average return (D) 47 36 6 25 6 19 4 143
z for sign test [C versus D] (2) −5.49** −2.63* 0.52 2.27* 3.83* 4.42* 1.55 1.79
* p < .05, ** p < .0001
Table 3: Twelve-month raw share returns.
Study 1 2 3 Overall
Sample UK UK Swedish UK Swedish Austrian (pooled)
Average stock return (A) 27.0 2.3 2.3 −1.3 −1.3 −1.3
Mean % return, recognition portfolios (B) −8.0 4.6 3.6 −6.4 0.1 −0.6
SD % return (recognition portfolios) 27.4 2.3 2.5 7.0 3.0 5.0
Effect size [B versus A] (1) −1.28 1.04 0.52 −0.73 0.47 0.14 −0.09
No. of portfolios > average return (C) 8 44 8 15 23 44 142
No. of portfolios < average return (D) 45 8 7 55 13 34 162
z for sign test [C versus D] (2) −4.94** 4.85** 0.00 −4.66** 1.50 1.02 −1.09
* p < .05, ** p < .0001
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Table 4: (a) 18-, (b) 24-, and (c) 30-month raw share returns.
(a) 18-month returns (b) 24-month returns (c) 30-month returns
Study 1 2 1 1
Sample UK UK Swedish UK UK
Average stock return (A) 84.3 28.5 28.5 87.4 130.4
Mean % return, recognition portfolios (B) 8.2 18.3 30.5 10.0 30.4
SD % return (recognition portfolios) 111.0 16.5 8.4 126.3 161.9
Effect size [B versus A] (1) −0.69 −0.62 0.24 −0.61 −0.62
No. of portfolios > average return (C) 3 10 11 3 7
No. of portfolios < average return (D) 50 42 4 50 46
z for sign test [C versus D] (2) −6.32** −4.30** 1.55 −6.32** −5.22**
* p < .05, ** p < .0001
where the reverse is true. For these non-parametric anal-
yses, a small effect would be observed if recognition port-
folios outperformed the complementary portfolios of un-
recognized shares 55% of the time, whereas a small-to-
medium effect would arise if the recognition portfolios
were better 60% of the time. Statistical power for each
of these analyses was in excess of 52% to detect a small
effect, and was in excess of 97% to detect a small-to-
medium effect. Thus, whilst we would not wish to argue
for no effect on the basis of null results, it is clear that our
studies had decent statistical power to identify a sizable
effect should one exist.
Using dividend-adjusted returns in place of raw returns
made some difference to the results. The advantage of
recognized over unrecognized shares for 2-month raw re-
turns in Study 3 disappeared. Overall, 32% of recogni-
tion portfolios outperformed their complementary port-
folio of unrecognized shares (previously 48% using raw
returns). This rather large discrepancy between the raw
and adjusted returns presumably arose because many of
the shares that we examined in Study 3 paid dividends
within the first two months of the study. Using dividend-
adjusted rather than raw returns made only a small dif-
ference to the results for the 6-month and 12-month hori-
zons. There was a small shift in favour of unrecognized
shares: the percentage of recognition portfolios outper-
forming their complementary portfolio of unrecognized
shares fell from 55% to 47% at 6 months, and from a 47%
to 43% at 12 months. For these dividend-adjusted returns,
z-tests indicated that the advantage of unrecognized over
recognized shares was significant for the 2-month (p <
.001) and 12-month (p < .05) horizons
3.3 The relationship between an individ-
ual’s recognition rate and the return on
his or her recognition portfolio.
Here we examine the claim that limited recognition best
exploits the value of recognition. We do so by consider-
ing the mean recognition rates of our study groups, and
the individual recognition rates of our participants. We
investigate whether an individual’s recognition rate bears
any relation to the returns that he or she accrued from
recognition-based investment. Table 1 shows the recogni-
tion rates for each sample in each study. No clear pattern
is discernable with respect to whether limited recognition
(“ignorance”) is advantageous. For example, in Study 3
the recognition portfolios of the UK students (who had
the lowest rate of recognition) performed worst (see Ta-
bles 1 to 3); whereas, in Study 2 the reverse is true for
12-month returns (see Table 3). To determine whether
participants who recognized fewer shares could expect
greater or lesser returns from their recognition portfo-
lios, we correlated portfolio size (number of shares rec-
ognized) with 2-month portfolio return across individuals
(see Table 5). Results are mixed, and do not point clearly
to an advantage for higher or lower levels of recog-
nition. We examined whether a quadratic relationship
might exist, whereby intermediate levels of recognition
might yield better, or perhaps worse, returns (see Gold-
stein & Gigerenzer, 1999, who demonstrate why inter-
mediate levels should usually be optimal in cases where
recognition is effective). The addition of a quadratic com-
ponent led to a significant increase in the proportion of
variance in return accounted for by portfolio size in all
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Table 5: Pearson r between number of shares in individuals’ recognition portfolios and portfolio return.
Study 1 2 3 4
Sample UK UK Swedish UK Swedish Austrian Swedish
By sample .32 .57 −.18 −.10 −.20 −.19 −.45
Combined across the study −0.06 .21
but the final study. In Studies 1 and 3, intermediate levels
or recognition were associated with greater recognition
portfolio returns, whereas in the other two studies inter-
mediate levels or recognition were associated with lower
returns. There seems to be no clear evidence favoring the
adaptivity of limited recognition.
3.4 Recognition-return correlations.
We now re-examine the value of recognition by treating
each share as a case for analysis. Specifically, we anal-
yse the relationship between the recognition rate of each
share and its return. For recognition to be a lucrative strat-
egy, this relationship should be positive with more highly
recognized shares yielding greater returns. Mean, me-
dian and 95% CIs for the correlation between company
name recognition and return are shown in Table 6. They
show no reliable relationship between recognition and re-
turn for each of the three shortest time periods. We fur-
ther examined whether the effect might differ according
to whether the shares under consideration were from the
same country as the participant group (“home”) or not
(“away”), as Borges et al. (1999) had found the strongest
recognition effect when participants in one country pro-
vided recognition data for shares in another country. For
“home” shares there is a slight tendency for more highly
recognized shares to yield lower returns, which is consis-
tent with Merton (1987), but at odds with Borges et al.
(1999). However, this is not significantly different from
the zero correlation observed for “away” shares.
4 Discussion
We failed to replicate Borges et al.’s (1999) finding that
highly recognized stocks perform better than average.
For recognition data from some participant groups for
particular stock markets over certain time periods, recog-
nition does yield better-than-average returns. However,
on a similar number of occasions it does not. The search
for any kind of regularity in our data throws up nothing
that would lead to rejecting the hypothesis that recogni-
tion is, on average, simply a near random method of se-
lecting stocks with respect to their profitability.
Furthermore, it is difficult to identify sub-cases where
recognition is reliably effective in this domain. With
respect to whether particular levels of recognition are
advantageous, sometimes recognition portfolios derived
from lower rates of recognition yielded better returns,
but sometimes the reverse was true. The search for
a quadratic relationship whereby intermediate levels of
recognition might yield better (or worse) returns than
both low and high levels of recognition also failed to
show a consistent or predictable pattern. Thus “igno-
rance” yields no special advantage or disadvantage.
The mixed findings as to whether recognition or “anti-
recognition” was the better strategy applied both in bull
and bear markets. Nonetheless, there is a clear suggestion
that market return may act as a moderator: the recogni-
tion heuristic tended to fare well in falling markets and
perform poorly in rising ones.4 We examined each of the
22 non-zero effects reported in Tables 1–4 for horizons
up to 18 months. Nine of the ten times that recognition
was the weaker strategy the market index was positive,
whereas, eight out of the twelve times that recognition
was the better strategy the market index had fallen (six
out of seven if one considers only significant effects).
This result is the reverse of what Borges et al. (1999)
and Boyd (2001) speculated. It demonstrates that tests
of the effectiveness of recognition require not only sam-
pling across participants but also sampling across stimuli
(in this case, different markets at different points in time)
if effective generalisations are to be made. Quite why
market return should moderate the effect of recognition
in this way deserves some consideration. Our finding of a
disadvantage for highly recognized stocks in rising mar-
kets aligns with the predictions of Merton’s (1987) the-
ory.5 But, to the best of our knowledge, Merton does not
predict a reversal of the effect of recognition during peri-
ods of falling prices. If shown by further investigation to
be reliable, this moderating effect of market return would
be of interest for financial economics.
4 We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this
tendency.
5Rising markets seem to represent the more usual state of the world
than falling markets, as indicated by analyses of historical stock-prices.
Ariel (1990) analyzed U.S. daily index returns from 1963 to 1982 and
found that roughly 55% of days had positive returns.
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Table 6: Pearson correlation (r) between company recognition (percentage of participants recognizing) and change in
share value. Home = for shares from the same country as the participant group; Away = for shares from a different
country to the participant group; N = number of correlation coefficients examined.
Time period For own or other country*
2 months 6 months 12 months “Home” “Away”
Mean −.05 −.06 −.01 −.15 .00
Median −.11 −.02 −.08 −.22 .01
95% CI −0.23, 0.12 −0.27, 0.16 −0.18, 0.17 −0.41, 0.12 −0.11, 0.11
N 19 19 16 14 40
*Results are pooled across 2-, 6-, and 12-month returns.
The effects that we report are not all fully independent
(e.g., 6-month returns are related to 2-month returns, and
recognition of UK residents will bear some relation to
that of Swedes). Hence, our observation of the moderat-
ing effect of market return may not be as clear cut as our
tallies in the previous paragraph suggest. However, the
suggestion of a moderating effect is clear enough to war-
rant further investigation. Other potential moderators of
the effectiveness of recognition (beyond the scope of our
data) may also be worthy of future investigation. There
may be types of markets or conditions where recogni-
tion (or anti-recognition) performs particularly well. In
addition, there may be individuals who are better able
to exploit these simple strategies. We considered one
such possibility — personal recognition rates (a proxy for
“knowledge”) — but found no consistent relationship be-
tween the number of shares recognized and the returns
from investing in recognized shares.
Overall, the recognition heuristic was shown to be in-
effective in outperforming average returns. If transac-
tion costs and risk characteristics were taken into ac-
count (Fama & French, 1993), the recognition strategy
may fare rather worse than our study indicates, as trans-
action costs for many investment products consisting of
well-diversified baskets of stocks (e.g., unit trusts and
tracker funds) are generally lower than for a personally
constructed portfolio. But can simple trading strategies
ever hope to beat the market index consistently? The effi-
cient market hypothesis says no — on the basis that once
a strategy is known to be effective, it is open to all to
use, and subsequently the competitive edge of the orig-
inator of the strategy is lost (Fama, 1991). Thus infor-
mation is incorporated into price movements in an effi-
cient market. Most of the available data support this po-
sition (Malkiel, 2003). However, some quirks of the stock
market which efficient markets would be expected to sup-
press have persisted over time, such as the tendency for
prices to rise as the weekend approaches (Thaler, 1987).
Following this reasoning, it could be that recognition was
a genuinely effective strategy at the time that Borges et al.
(1999) examined it, but through the publicity their find-
ings earned the market “gobbled up” this strategy when
investors got wise to it (Ortmann, personal communica-
tion). This is a difficult position to argue against — as it
would seem to be an unfalsifiable proposition. However,
we note that given the extent of our data, this adjustment
in the market would have to have applied to several Euro-
pean stock markets. Much as we are fond of the idea that
academic research has impact outside our ivory towers,
it is probably more parsimonious to assume that the suc-
cess of recognition was attributable to factors that are per-
haps random, or, more likely, irregular or unpredictable
— i.e., particular combinations of factors that may not
occur again, or may occur with no particular regularity.
We ought to be careful to state that we are not trying to
argue strongly that recognition generates portfolios that
are systematically worse than random. For mean return
over two month (and for dividend adjusted returns over
two months and twelve months) the data are marginally
in that direction. Such an observation could be consid-
ered to accord with Barber and Odean (2005), who found
that shares that were heavily traded or that received ex-
tensive media coverage were less profitable than average.
However, were one to add the Borges et al. (1999) data
to ours, the combined result would be close to a zero av-
erage effect. Similarly, the weak negative correlation be-
tween recognition and return for “home” shares is con-
sistent with Merton (1987), but we can think of no reason
why Merton would not predict a similar relationship for
“away” shares. Therefore, one could take the more opti-
mistic view that recognition is as good a way of picking
stocks as picking a similar number of shares at random.
Given that the small-time, naïve or casual investor often
fails to pick stocks that outperform random picks (Jasen,
2002), this could be said to be a viable personal invest-
ment strategy (with the proviso that portfolios ought to
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be sufficiently large and diverse to avoid exposing the in-
vestor to excessive financial risk).
Boyd (2001) conjectured that his failure to replicate the
findings of Borges et al. (1999) could have been because
his participants were students, who might be expected to
recognize rather different companies to the general popu-
lation (who were sampled by Borges et al.). We have had
the same question put to us in respect of our own data,
which we investigated by conducting a further survey of
share recognition in June 2006. Share recognition data
from 88 students from the University of Essex was com-
pared against data from 18 university employees and 62
members of the general public who were approached in
the centre of Colchester (a medium-sized provincial town
within commuting distance of London). Participants in-
dicated if they recognized each of 114 company names:
the companies used were those listed on the UK FTSE100
share index, plus the Swedish companies that we exam-
ined in Study 2 (presented as a single list in alphabetical
order). Mean percentage recognition was higher among
the non-student group (42.4% versus 33.4%). However,
crucially, the correlation between the levels of company
name recognition elicited from the two groups was ex-
tremely strong (r = .95). Thus companies that enjoy rela-
tively higher (or lower) name recognition among students
also enjoy higher (or lower) levels of recognition among
a non-student population. Thus, as long as one’s goal is
to identify which companies have high or low levels of
recognition among the general populace, as opposed to
estimating precise levels of recognition, a student sample
would appear to be perfectly adequate.
We also used these data to investigate whether our re-
liance on small samples of participants in some studies
could have influenced the results by producing unreliable
recognition data. The percentage company name recogni-
tion was computed using the data from 15 randomly cho-
sen participants. This was correlated with the correspond-
ing recognition levels computed from the remaining 153
participants. This procedure was repeated 50 times. The
median correlation between the small and large samples
was .96 (range .94 to .97). Thus, even a modestly sized
sample can provide a remarkably clear indication of the
best- and least-well recognized companies (as determined
by a much larger sample of people).
Previous research on share recognition using proxy
measures of recognition (such as investor base) that are
easily extracted from existing data bases have been able
to examine large numbers of shares . In committing our-
selves to a direct behavioural measure of recognition we
restricted ourselves to examining a rather smaller num-
ber of shares than we would have wished. However, the
shares that we examined spanned the full range from the
highly recognized to the rarely recognized. Therefore, if
recognition has a clear impact upon share return it ought
to have been the case that we had a good chance of ob-
serving this in our data.
We have not directly examined cognition in this paper
— simply whether a particular simple (cognitive) strat-
egy is a viable basis for decisions in a complex economic
market. However, our results do have some bearing upon
cognition, in so far as some have suggested that recogni-
tion may have a privileged status such that when it can be
used it often will be without recourse to additional infor-
mation or further processing (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gold-
stein, 1999). Here we have unearthed at least one exam-
ple to suggest that were such a privileged status to exist, it
will not always be to the decision maker’s benefit. Quite
possibly, the dynamic nature of a market provides a rather
challenging environment for recognition to prosper in —
making it difficult for such a strategy to make reliable and
sustainable profits.
It is often hard to present null or conflicting results —
especially when, as here, prior research has found evi-
dence of a relationship. We cannot argue that recognition
has no impact upon share return. However, our results
indicate that any average effect over a range of times and
locations is likely to be small (and, if there is an effect,
that it is likely to favour unrecognized rather than rec-
ognized shares). Indeed, this is apparent in many of the
prior investigations that we have discussed: breadth of
ownership (the most common proxy measure of recog-
nition) accounts, at most, for 1% of the variance in share
return (e.g., Bodnaruk & Östberg, 2005; Lehavy & Sloan,
2005). We can think of many situations where recog-
nition provides useful information to guide inference or
choice — and can improve upon simple guesses or ran-
dom selections. However, we think our data adequately
demonstrate that investment in shares is unlikely to be
one of them. Our data do suggest that recognition may
be relatively effective when a market is falling — but on
these occasions, it merely serves to limit one’s losses —
and you would be better off selling your shares, and buy-
ing bonds, or putting the money under your mattress.
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